

[43] "Guinea requests that the Tribunal's decision on costs be annulled because it has failed to state the reasons on which its award of US\$75,000 in costs of the ICSID arbitration was based.

[44] "The award of costs is not part of the award of damages on account of profits foregone. The amount of costs claimed by MINE was contested by Guinea on the ground that it included costs incurred in the attempted measure of constraint in execution of the MA award. The Tribunal apparently took that argument into account and awarded a lower amount. Art. 61(2) of the Convention provides that the Tribunal shall decide how and by whom the costs of proceedings including the expenses incurred by the parties, the fees and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the charge for the use of facilities of the Centre shall be paid. The Article confers a discretionary power on the Tribunal which was in particular under no obligation to state reasons for its decision. The parties exchanged lengthy arguments in this respect with the Tribunal and the Commission on the responsibility of Guinea, viz. that MINE had failed to accept Guinea's offer to let MINE share half the financial agreement. In view of the Commission's decision to annul the damages portion of the Award, it does not find it necessary to deal with the question whether the Tribunal's determination of Guinea's contribution rightly furnished an independent ground for annulment."

10. Art. 61 of the Convention reads in relevant part:

"(2) In the case of arbitral proceedings the Tribunal shall, except in the case of arbitration, decide how and by whom the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the proceedings, and

the fees and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the charge for the use of the facilities of the Centre shall be paid. Such decision shall be final.

provisional award."

52 ~ ~ ~ ~ bX~'V"(I b ~

ICSID: MINE u. GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA

awarding costs against the losing party. Guinea has not alleged that the Tribunal abused its discretion.

"The award of costs can nevertheless not remain in existence since it is, viz., that Guinea was the losing party, has disappeared as a result of the annulment of the portion of the Award relating to damages. The award of costs cannot survive the annulment of that portion of the Award with which it is inextricably linked. The Committee therefore finds that the award of costs must be annulled in consequence of the annulment of the damages portion of the Award. ~ r b ' nX Y~(1 991)

Adriano Gardella S.p.A. v. Côte d'Ivoire (ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1), Award, 29 August 1977

ADRIANO GARDELLASAP A v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
IVORY COAST

29 August 1977*

(Arbitration Tribunal: Mr Pierre Cavinl, President;
r Jacques Michel GrossenZ and Mr Dominique Poncet, Members)

MARY: The facts: - On 25 April 1967 Adriano Gardella SpA
"), an Italian company, entered into an agreement ("the 1967
")with the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast (the
ernment") for the conversion and cultivation of 20,000 hectares of
and for the construction of a textile factory. Part of the hemp was to be
ed to the factory for manufacture into finished goods for export and
ronology of the proceedings in this case is set out at p. xi.
inted in April 1976 after the death of Mr Andre Panchaud.
inted in August 1975 after the death of Mr Edouard Zellweger.

284 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST

the rest of the hemp was to be sold externally as raw fibre. The
Agreement provided for the formation of a jointly owned limited I
company through which the farming and industrial business wo
realized. Gardella was to supply the technical and commercial experts
undertook to negotiate the loans necessary for the capitalization
project with Italian financial institutions. The loans were to be gubr
by the Government. The 1967 Agreement also provided for an exper
phase in which studies would be conducted to ascertain the profita
the proposed farming and industrial venture and to assess
conditions.

A codicil to the 1967 Agreement was entered into on 10 August 19
Codicil") which provided, inter alia, that the company to be formed
upon receiving Government approval, proceed to order the ne
equipment and materials for the project from Gardella once the stud
been completed and showed the possibility of profit.

On 30 October 1967, pursuant to the 1967 Agreement and the Cod
Société Ivoirienne Agricole et Industriel du Kbnaf ("SIVAK'
incorporated by the parties at Abidjan as the company through whi
project was to be realized. The production studies were commenced a
clearing of the land began.

In a supplementary agreement dated 6 August 1970 ("the
Agreement") Gardella acknowledged that the necessary financing had
obtained, that the cultivation trials had been successful and that SIVA
therefore ready to proceed with the project. The 1970 Agreem
provided for certain amendments to the structure of the parties' asso
Article IX of the 1970 Agreement provided for the submission of dis
relating to the project to ICSID arbitration.

At the end of September 1970 Gardella presented to the Governm
document entitled the "Brown Dossier" which contained, inter a

Ila, acting on behalf of Gardella, presented the findings of the Yellow er stating that if the Government did not accept the renewed ediate commissioning of the factory then his a partner in SIVAK but would continue pplier only. The representatives of the ese proposals, considering further reflection as asked to put his company's position in ardella wrote via SIVAK to the Minister attaching ten r amounts covering the balance which Gardella alleged to be owing to erials for the first portion of the project. Gardella e authorized and endorsed by the Government for tation to the IMI for payment. The letter referred to Gardella's tion as technical expertladvisor but did not specifically reiterate the ken at the meeting of the Board of Directors.

della's further request for action on the part of the Government of 20 ember and 13 December 1973 went unheeded. On 30 January 1974 della wrote to the Minister advising him that if the bills were not with the CAA for transmission to the IMI by 15 would proceed to initiate arbitration

submitted an application for arbitration to overnment had terminated the agreements

286 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST

between the parties by failing to pay Gardella for the services and materi supplied and by delaying the completion of the necessary formalit₁ between the IMI and the CAA for the signature of the interbank agreeme thereby breaching its obligations under the agreements. Gardella sou payment of the amounts outstanding, damages for lost profits due to failure of the project and interest thereon, damages for injury to reputation and credit rating and costs and expenses. It requested t appointment of an expert to determine the amount of lost profits and determine the amount of profits which SIVAK would have made had project been realized, 50% of which would have gone to Gardella. Gard also claimed reimbursement of all expenses and loans which it incu relating to the establishment of SIVAK.

The Government rejected Gardella's arguments on the basis that were ill-founded and inadmissible and filed a counterclaim against Gar for damages arising from Gardella's termination of the agreement. Government also raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of Tribunal arguing that Gardella's action was against SIVAK and not Government which was therefore erroneously before the Tribunal. Held: -TheTribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute and both the cl and the counterclaim were rejected.

(1) The objection raised by the Government did not relate to competence of the Tribunal but was, rather, a dispute relating to the rig

of SIVAK and to whether the Government or SIVAK would be responsible for the debts. This argument related to the merits of the case and the interpretation of the 1970 and 1971 Agreements. It was therefore not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (pp. 287).

(2) It had not been established that either party had failed to perform its obligations incumbent on them prior to the autumn of 1973. Furthermore, no time until the opening of the arbitration proceedings had Gardella availed itself of the delays of the Government as a ground for terminating the agreement. Rather, it had continued to express a desire to carry on the project as modified. Gardella was therefore estopped from claiming damages for non-performance by the Government (pp. 288-9).

(3) The Government was under no obligation to give effect to Gardella's letter of 3 October requesting the authorization and endorsement of the bills. Gardella had repudiated the agreements binding on the parties at a meeting of the Board of Directors and the letter, while not confirming the repudiation, had in no way weakened it. Gardella could not, therefore, rely on the agreements which it had already renounced to hold the Government responsible for obligations thereunder (pp. 289-92).

(4) The Government had made no attempt to hold Gardella accountable to perform its contractual obligations and had itself, shown little alacrity in carrying out the project. It had thereby manifested its own willingness to renounce the continuation of the joint venture and could not hold Gardella responsible for any damages arising therefrom (pp. 293).

(5) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to order the dissolution or winding up of SIVAK.

AWARD 287
was therefore unable to calculate or divide up the assets of SIVAK between the parties (pp. 294).

(6) The parties would each bear all their own costs of the proceedings and each half of the costs and expenses of the Tribunal and the Centre of Arbitration. This is a translation from the French of that portion of the Award which has been released for publication:

IV

THE LAW

As to the Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Raised by the Applicant pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 4 of the Protocol of Agreement of 6 August 1970, Gardella is entitled to take action, in the present arbitration proceedings, against the Government of the Ivory Coast and to formulate claims on the aforesaid agreement. The submissions put forward by Gardella have all been directed against the Government of the Ivory Coast; they are based on the supplementary agreement of 6 August 1970 as well as the supplementary agreement of 13 November 1971. These submissions thus fall within the framework of the dispute submitted, and in accordance with the common will of the parties, to the present arbitration. In view of the above, the argument raised by the respondent does not deal with

competence of the Tribunal to give a ruling on those submissions. It is better characterized as a dispute over an active or passive justification parties, of rights which, according to the respondent were given to K as of right or of debts for which that company would be solely untahle, to the exclusion of the Government of the Ivory Coast. This es to disputing the rights to which the claimant would not be contesting that the Government should be responsible for the s of which the only debtor would be SIVAK. This argument relates to the se. It will be examined with the merits if necessary. Therefore objection to the competence of the Tribunal is rejected.

s to the Merits:

. Both parties admit that their agreement is governed by the law of the Coast. Gardella has pleaded, it is true, that the law of the Ivory Coast to apply, in this case, within the framework and in the context of ional law. However, Gardella has not drawn any other lusion from that argument than that it is necessary to have regard to the "pact sunt servanda" and to the principle of good faith, principles which qually recognized by the law of the Ivory Coast as well as by French law.

288 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST

4.4. By their agreements of 25 April and 10 August 1967 and o August 1970, the parties agreed to pool their resources and their ski1 with a view to sharing the profits resulting from their cooperation. agreement qualifies as a contract of partnership according to Article of the Civil Code of the Ivory Coast. Such a contract implies, by its natu and its object, a collaboration between the parties, consistent with t goal which they have assigned themselves and in conformity with t means which they have mutually agreed upon. An essential element this agreement was the formation of a joint-stock limited li company organized under the law of the Ivory Coast, S~VAKIvoirian Agricole et Industriel du Kenaf at Abidjan, as the instrument the realization of their joint venture.

It is important to specify, in this regard, that the contract of partner concluded by the parties could not be assimilated to an agreement bet two shareholders on the exercise of their ri-rh t to vote in a joint-st company, any more than SIVAK could be considered as a "comm subsidiary".

4.5. Despite the grievances put forward by each party, it has not b established that, up to the beginning of autumn of 1973, any of the pa had failed to fulfil their obligations.

Without doubt, on severa~occasionsb, efore the autumn of 1973, Ga had complained of the dilatoriness of its partner. Gardella raises the ' attributing the delays which it blames on the Government of the Ivory to the influences of representatives of interests opposed to the enterpr Whether these grievances do not appear devoid of all appearanc

foundation and whether the Tribunal holds that the authorities of the Ivory Coast showed little alacrity in their cooperation with Gardella, the claimant has not supplied proof of either deliberate delays or of an indisputable lack of diligence.

Moreover, and this is decisive, at no moment until the opening of the present proceedings, did Gardella avail himself of the delays of the Government of the Ivory Coast as a ground for termination of the contract. The agreement of 13 November 1971, which instituted a new timetable, did not contain any such reservation.

Without doubt, the timetable provided for in that agreement was not respected, but, in the terms of the agreement itself, the non-respect of the anticipated schedule involved a simple modification in the timetable. Moreover, it has not been established that the delay subsequent to the agreement of 13 November 1971 could be attributable to the fault of the Government. The financing agreement, a condition precedent to the bringing into operation of the agreement, was signed on 17 November 1972 without the delay in the signing of the loan being imputable to the Government of the Ivory Coast. The contract, except for the period running from the end of August to November 1972, was transmitted to the CAA on 24 August 1972. Moreover, and this is also determinative, in September and October 1973, while certainly complaining of the slowness of its partner, Gardella did not avail himself of a delay by its partner as a ground for termination. On the contrary, still at the end of September 1973, Gardella made manifestly his intention to

AWARD

resolve to carry on the joint venture according to the terms which had been modified as a result of the changes in the economic conditions.

The Tribunal therefore does not find any complaint prior to September 1973 which justifies the claim by Gardella to damages for the non-performance of the Ivory Coast of its obligations.

Gardella essentially avails himself of the refusal of the Government of the Ivory Coast to give effect to its letter of 3 October 1973 in which the Government was invited to endorse ten bills of exchange in the amount of 986,070,000 Italian Lira and to authorize SIVAK to accept those bills. Gardella maintains that this refusal constitutes a faulty non-performance of the agreements binding upon the parties. Accordingly, it claims full compensation for the damage which it says it has suffered because of the fact that the Government did not give effect to that damage comprising the loss of the investment. In this instance, on the claimant's behalf, it is sufficient to establish that in regard to the obligations assumed by the Government, it is not possible to claim compensation therefor that the Government give effect to its obligations. The Tribunal, based on the conclusions of a majority of the members of the Tribunal, finds that the Government (the "Brown Society"), had as their object the cultivation of 20,000 hectares of hemp, the construction and the equipping of a factory with the annual production capacity of 6,000

articles, the commercialization on the foreign markets of processed goods, as well as that of fibre not processed on the spot (Protocol of 25 April 1967, Article I). Article IV(4) of the agreement of 6 August 1970, confirms that the production of the factory was conceived to be essentially for export. The study carried out by Gardella predicted that the plant ought to produce:

during a first period, 4,000 tonnes of fibres for export;
during a second period, 8,000 tonnes of fibres for export;
during a third period, 16,000 tonnes of fibres, part of which was destined for export and the rest for use in the textile factory, which ought, in 1975-76 (3rd period) to have produced around 6 million bags per year ("Brown Dossier", annexe 115 of the economic sub-dossier).
calculated at around US \$450,000.

elements of the agreement between the parties,
which were not affected by the supplementary agreement of 13 November 1973, Gardella communicated to its partner a
technical study dated July 1973 (called the "Yellow Dossier")
carried out on its behalf by experts whose
this report confirms, in the essential elements, the previous technical
conclusions are, on the other hand,
from this new study that the economic conditions had
deteriorated. It was proposed to reduce from 20,000 to 12,000 hectares the
area of the plantations, in order to produce 9,600 tonnes per year, of which
290 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST
approximately 3,500 tonnes would be exportable at advantageous
conditions; the balance "which does not have the possibility of profitable
sale", would have to be converted into manufactured products, that
"approximately 6 millions bags per year, of which the market in the Ivory
Coast has a need" (Yellow Dossier, Exh. XI1 of Gardella, p. 19).
production of other products (string, rope, etc.) was eliminated due to the
competition of synthetic fibres. The consequence was the necessity to
proceed without delay with the construction of the factory.

The conclusions of this study led Gardella to present new proposals to
its partners, consisting, essentially, of limiting the production to 8,000
10,000 tonnes of fibres and to constructing the textile factory immediately.
On this last point, among others, the proposal differed from the
agreement of 1971, which provided for the commencement of the operation
of the textile factory as from September 1974, in parallel with a production
of 16,000 tonnes of fibres - even though in 1973 the area under cultivation
was still at a level of 600 hectares.

Gardella laid stress on the evolution of the situation, only about 40%
of the hemp being exportable, the rest would have to be processed; it is not
that the 1971 timetable had been overrun, that the evolution of the market
was such that one could no longer take account of that timetable, that

factory ought to be completed simultaneously with the first availability of raw material - and not with the last period.

These proposals, were presented by Mr Adriano Gardella, acting on behalf of Gardella, at the meeting of the Board of Directors of SIVAK on 10 September 1973, which was attended by, in particular, Messrs Aka An and Lazare Y&bou&, the Government's representatives on the Board of Directors.

The representatives of the Government of the Ivory Coast on the Board of Directors were unable to accept these new proposals, in particular, as the immediate construction of the factory was concerned.

Nevertheless, Mr Gardella persisted in his opinion, presenting his submissions as "final", excluding all other solutions, declaring, according to the minutes of the meeting, the accuracy of which he admitted under his testimony, that if these proposals were not accepted "his group will no longer be a partner, but in the capacity of a supplier. It will be necessary to consider its role as that of supplier and no longer as that of a partner in SIVAK" (Minutes, p. 16).

As for the Government of the Ivory Coast, the proposal envisaged the construction of the factory as soon as the plantation had reached 3,000 hectares, whereas the timetable established by the agreement of 10 November 1971 provided for this construction once production had reached 16,000 tonnes of fibres.

This compromise proposal was not accepted by Mr Gardella, who clearly and repeatedly argued that the decision to immediately construct the factory was a condition of maintaining his cooperation as a partner.

At the end of the meeting, Mr Gardella was asked to clarify the position of his group in writing, to which he did not object.

One would have expected that after this meeting Mr Gardella would have clarified his position, whether he confirmed it, or whether he envisaged an intermediate solution, such as his partners had suggested.

Instead, his letter of 3 October 1973 to the Minister of Economics and Finance, cited in paragraph 2.19,11 which referred paradoxically "to the arrangements made at the last meetings of the Board of Directors of SIVAK", not make any mention of the fundamental disagreement which had manifested itself at that meeting and addressed, as though nothing had happened, the issue of the endorsement of the bills by the Government and to be signed by SIVAK.

That letter does not weaken the categorical declarations presented as the expression of an irrevocable decision, declarations according to which if the Government did not accept his proposal, Gardella would cease to be a partner and its role would become simply one of supplier. The letter is ambiguous in that the bills presented for endorsement by the Government responded to the costs of clearing the land foreseen for the second

iod, 8,000 hectares, the area of which, in its last proposals, Gardella had
ited its partner to limit the exploitation of. These indications could have
the Government to believe that Gardella was maintaining the position
ich it had taken at the meeting of the Board of Directors of 13 September
.7. Gardella was not entitled, under the agreements, to demand of its
tner a complete change of the agreed conditions of exploitation. It did
constitute, in fact, a simple "updating", provided for in the agreement as
adjustments relating to execution deadlines and prices and
itated by the evolution of the economic conditions, but an essential
cation of the fundamental bases of the agreement: the areas to be
'ted were reduced by a half; the intended destination of the products,
'ally for export under the terms of the agreement, was totally
ed; the processing of the fibres became the primary goal and was to
cide with "the first availability of raw material", while according to the
ement the processing would not occur until the last period which was to
at the end of the programme. Moreover, under the terms of the
ement of 6 August 1970, the readjustments relating to the factory had to
pproved by the Government.

ardella could only obtain such a modification to the basic terms of the
nership agreement with the consent of its partner. But it could not
ose this. Without doubt, in view of the conclusions of the Yellow
sier, it was entitled, in the absence of any agreement, having regard to
tides 1865(5) and 1869 of the Civil Code, to put an end to the partnership
reement. Such renunciation could not amount to bad faith: the execution
he project had singularly dragged on and, in the meantime, the economic
nditions had deteriorated. Gardella was especially entitled to avail itself
his fact as, by the agreement of 6 August 1970, it had assumed rather
vy responsibilities and had accepted considerable risks, in particular by
ranteeing the total disposal of the production for a long period of time,
ontracting to cover all losses, and by giving its shares in SIVAK as security.
his part of the decision has not been not released for publication.]

292 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST

The Government did not have the right to demand that, in spite of the
economic conditions, Gardella should persevere in its cooperation in
particularly heavy conditions to which it had agreed in August 1970.
Gardella appears to have been aware of this situation. Its position at
meeting of 13 September was perfectly clear and explicit: if its partner
not agree to its proposals, Gardella would cease to be a partner and wo
remain as a supplier only. As the representatives of the Government refu
to accept those proposals and, in particular, firmly declared that it was o
the question to commission the immediate construction of the factor
particular, it can only be concluded that Gardella renounced the partners
agreement. Its position could be interpreted as a renunciation of
partnership agreement, addressed to the representatives of the Governm

of the Ivory Coast, validly putting an end to the partnership agreement. It is, however, not necessary to decide this issue. It is sufficient, in order to establish, for the purposes of Gardella's claims to damages, the position taken by Gardella, on 13 September 1973, which was contradicted by its letter of 3 October, deprives such claims of their foundation. Gardella could not pretend, by relying on the agreement of 1967 and 1970, that the Government should carry out obligations arising from agreements which Gardella had announced, a few days previously, that if its proposals were not accepted - and they were not -, would cease to be binding upon it, that Gardella would no longer act as a partner. Certainly, Gardella had declared that it would continue its role as supplier and expert. But it could not disassociate its obligations towards the Government, which was bound by the partnership agreement which was a whole and is not divisible. At no time had the Government envisaged assuming sole responsibility for the venture and to act as manager of the factory, reducing Gardella's role to that of entrepreneur and technical consultant, as witnessed by a reading of the aforementioned clauses of the agreement of August 1970, according to which Gardella guaranteed the production of the products and took under its charge the eventual losses. In short, by refusing to abide by the contract, Gardella could not, under the terms of the same contract, demand of the Government the endorsement of the bills of exchange and its agreement to their acceptance by SIVAK.

The claimant therefore cannot invoke the non-performance by its part of its obligations and, accordingly, cannot claim damages. It is unnecessary, therefore, to examine whether its claim would have been doomed to failure for other reasons, argued at length by the parties. In particular, the validity of the orders with regard to Article 40 of the Companies Act of 20 July 1867, the regularity of the summons, and the conformity of the amount of the bills with the parties' agreement. Finally, one cannot isolate the letter of 3 October 1973 and consider it without taking the declaration of Gardella at the meeting of 13 September into account. If the claimant, by that letter, had intended to go back on its declarations of 13 September, if it intended to place its demand to have bills signed and endorsed within the scope of the agreement, with which it had the intention of strictly complying, it was incumbent on it to do so.

AWARD

The claimant unequivocally retract its remarks of 13 September. The Tribunal is, therefore, convinced that that was not the intention of Gardella.

8. The Government of the Ivory Coast, for its part, appears to have reacted well to the situation created by Gardella. It did not respond to the letter of 3 October and remained in a state of inactivity. It did not express any objection or the least reservation. It left unanswered Gardella's communications of 13 December 1973 and 30

uary 1974, which insisted that effect should be given to its letter of 3
ober. It did not deem it necessary to clarify the situation. Finally, at no
, did the Government put Gardella on notice to perform its obligations
on conformity with the agreements of 1967, 1970 and 1971.

o useful deduction can be drawn from the copy of a letter, whose
atory is unknown, written on SIVAK letterhead and addressed to the
ector of SIVAK (Exh. 76 of the respondent).

n attempt to reconcile the parties made in 1974- at the time the present
ton was started - by the former ambassador of Italy to Abidjan, Mr
lasco, was cut short. Mr A. Gardella, who had come expressly to Abidjan
he request of Mr Bolasco, was informed, upon his arrival, that the
ouncil of Ministers had decided not to pursue that matter any further.
he Government, which in the course of the preceding years had already
little eagerness in carrying out the project, had, therefore,
sted its willingness to renounce, on its part, the continuation of the
ccordingly, the Government cannot claim damages for the nonperformance
by its partner of a partnership agreement, which, moreover,
osing that it had not done so on 13 September 1973, Gardella was
led in law to renounce.

inally there is no reason to hold the annulment of the contract against
of the parties to an agreement, the performance of which neither party
nded to carry on, each party having expressed its will to renounce the
uit, on the agreed conditions, of the joint venture. The company
stituted by these agreements between the parties was, therefore,
olved in any event, by the will of both parties from March 1974 at the
.9. The counterclaim (2) presented by the Government of the Ivory
st in its Counter-Memorial seeks a declaration "that the provisions of
cle VIII of the Protocol dated 24 April 1967 relating to the recovery of
goods F.O.B. by Gardella are applicable".

clause aims at the hypothesis in which the results of the trials would
themselves to be inferior to the predictions. Now it has not been
by the arguments that the results of the trials, by which the
derstands the cultivation trials, were lower than the expectations
ies. The counterclaim must therefore be rejected.

Tribunal has considered whether some of the claims submitted
each side could be awarded not as damages for the non-performance of
agreement, the conditions for which were not, in its opinion, fulfilled,
rather in respect of the settlement of the partner's accounts. Could one
ermine the amount of the respective contributions to be brought into the
294 ADRIANO GARDELLA v. IVORY COAST

liquidation account of the company formed by the parties, would that, in t
application of the rules of the company, allow the Tribunal to order one
the parties to restore the equality of the contributions, in conformity w~t
the Protocol of 6 August 1970?

However, the company having been dissolved, these are transactions which must take place within the framework of the division of the property insofar as the assets, after payment of debts, do not permit the restoration of the equality of the contributions.

This would lead, therefore, to the liquidation of the company, that is the division between the partners within the meaning of Article 1872 of the Civil Code, a matter with which the Tribunal is not seized. Furthermore, the settlement between the partners assumes that what should first be dissolved and liquidated is SIVAK, the organization in which the two partners combined their resources and skills. It is through the intermediary of SIVAK that the transactions involved in the execution of the agreements between the parties occurred, to the exclusion of any direct contributions or payments between the partners.

Moreover, unless the parties reach an agreement on the fate of SIVAK, the issue of whether one partner will remain the debtor of the other will result from the liquidation of SIVAK.

Now the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction either to order dissolution or to originate the liquidation of SIVAK.

4.11. It is fitting, therefore, to reject all the submissions of the parties.

C. Cost of the Arbitration

4.12. Article 61(2), of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes provides that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the Tribunal shall assess the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the proceedings and shall decide the methods of division and payment of the said expenses, the costs and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the amounts due for the use of the facilities of the Centre. This decision is an integral part of the award.

Neither the above mentioned Convention, nor the Arbitration Rules impose any rules on arbitrators as to the distribution of costs.

The distribution is therefore left to the discretion of the arbitrators.

The submissions of the two parties are entirely rejected.

Without doubt, the submissions of the claimant appear more substantial than the counterclaim - the latter not having been examined at this stage of the proceedings - and have given rise to the greater part of the arguments.

Nevertheless, in view of the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal considers it equitable that each party should bear its own costs and expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings and that the costs and expenses of the Tribunal, as well as the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre should be divided equally between the parties.

It is therefore not necessary to assess the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the proceedings.

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AWARD 295

The costs and expenses of the members of the Tribunal and the sums due

for the use of the facilities of the Centre, including the cost of transcription of the arguments, are calculated at SF 246,865.96.

For these reasons,

The Arbitration Tribunal, having deliberated fully and behind closed doors, deciding unanimously,

As to the Objection to Jurisdiction:

The objection to jurisdiction raised by the respondent is rejected.

As to the Merits:

All the submissions of the parties, including the counterclaim, are

. As to the Costs of the Arbitration and the Costs of the Parties:

1. Each party will bear its own costs of the proceedings.
2. Each party will bear one half of the costs and expenses of the Tribunal and the dues due for the use of the facilities of the Centre, assessed at 246,865.96 Swiss Francs.