On 1 August 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) issued a new decision in Case C-600/23, Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA, in which it addressed a fundamental question: how far should EU courts go in reviewing arbitral awards handed down by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), particularly when such awards involve matters of EU public policy?
The decision strikes at the heart of the long-standing tension between the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the primacy of EU law. While CAS has long been the mandatory forum for disputes within football and other sports, its awards are seated in Switzerland, outside the EU’s judicial framework. The CJEU’s ruling makes clear that EU courts cannot simply defer to CAS awards or Swiss judicial review where EU rights and freedoms are at stake, reaffirming the importance of effective judicial protection within the Union.
Background and Procedural History
The Contracts
Royal Football Club Seraing SA (“RFC Seraing”) is a Belgian football club affiliated to the Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (“URBSFA”).[1] On 30 January 2015, it concluded a contract with Maltese company Doyen Sports Investment Ltd. (“Doyen”) to provide a framework for the future conclusion of financing agreements regarding players and to transfer to Doyen 30% of RFC Seraing’s economic rights over three specific players.[2]
On 7 July 2015, RFC Seraing and Doyen concluded a second contract providing for the transfer of 25% of RFC Seraing’s economic rights over a fourth player to Doyen in return for EUR 50,000.[3]
FIFA Disciplinary Proceedings
Following an investigation, the Fédération internationale de football association (“FIFA”), with the assistance of URBSFA, initiated disciplinary proceedings against RFC Seraing, in which the FIFA Disciplinary Committee found that RFC Seraing had infringed Articles 18bis and 18ter of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”), which prohibit third-party influence and third-party ownership, with regard to the two contracts, prohibiting the club from registering players for four consecutive registration periods and imposing a fine of 150,000 Swiss francs, payable within 30 days of notification.[4]
RFC Seraing first appealed the decision before the FIFA Appeal Committee, where it was dismissed, before appealing to the CAS, seeking an annulment of the Appeal Committee’s dismissal.[5]
(For more information on FIFA dispute resolution, see here.)
CAS Proceeding
In the CAS proceedings, RFC Seraing argued that Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP were contrary to Articles 45, 56 and 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), guaranteeing the freedom of movement for workers, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, respectively, as well as EU and Swiss competition rules.[6]
However, the CAS disagreed. On 9 March 2017, it issued an award finding, inter alia, that while Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP restricted the free movement of capital, the existence of the articles was warranted by the pursuit of legitimate objectives in the general interest that relate to sporting matters, in particular to preserving the integrity of competitions. It concluded that the articles’ content showed not only that they were appropriate for achieving those objectives, but also that they were necessary and proportional.[7]
The CAS also found that Articles 18bis and 18ter RSTP did not violate EU competition rules, as their purpose was not to restrict competition, but to pursue legitimate objectives, and RFC Seraing had not demonstrated that the articles had any actual or potential restrictive effect on competition.[8]
Swiss Federal Supreme Court
On 15 May 2017, RFC Seraing filed for the annulment of the CAS award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, alleging that the award was contrary to substantive public policy within the meaning of Swiss law for the same reasons as in the CAS proceedings.[9] The Swiss court dismissed the action, holding that competition rules are not a part of substantive public policy.[10]
Belgian Court Proceedings
On 3 April 2015 (prior to FIFA bringing the disciplinary proceedings against RFC Seraing), Doyen and RFC Sérésien, a Belgian non-profit that runs RFC Seraing, brought proceedings against FIFA, the Union des associations européennes de football (“UEFA”) and the URBSFA before Belgian courts.[11]
On 8 July 2015, in parallel with the FIFA Disciplinary Committee proceedings, RFC Seraing voluntarily intervened in the Belgian case, advancing the same arguments about 18bis and 18ter that it would use before the CAS.[12]
On 17 November 2016, the Brussels Commercial Court held that it had no jurisdiction to examine RFC Seraing’s requests, and on 19 December 2016, RFC Seraing appealed the judgment before the Brussels Court of Appeal.[13]
The Brussels Court of Appeal dismissed the claims on 12 December 2019, finding that RFC Seraing’s grounds of appeal had already been raised by the club before the CAS and had been rejected in the CAS award, which must be regarded as having the authority of res judicata from the day it was made and the day on which the Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed the action brought against the award. It therefore found the grounds of appeal inadmissible insofar as they were directed against FIFA.[14]
The Court of Appeal also held that the CAS award had probative value vis-à-vis the URBSFA, which was not a party to the dispute between RFC Seraing and FIFA before the CAS.[15] In light of that probative value, it was for RFC Seraing to rebut the presumption based on the CAS award that Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP are compatible with EU law.[16] However, RFC Seraing failed to do so.[17] It therefore also rejected the grounds of appeal as they were directed against URBSFA.[18]
Questions Referred to the CJEU
RFC Seraing then brought an appeal on a point of law before the Belgian Court of Cassation against the judgment of the Brussels Court of Appeals, which the Court of Cassation then referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court of Cassation raised the following two questions:
- Does Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), read in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“Charter”), preclude the application of provisions of national law such as Article 24 and Article 1713(9) of the Belgian Judicial Code, laying down the principle of res judicata, to an arbitral award the conformity of which with EU law has been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a Member State of the European Union, which is not permitted to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling?[19]
- Does Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, preclude the application of a rule of national law according probative value vis-à-vis third parties, subject to evidence to the contrary which it is for them to adduce, to an arbitral award the conformity of which with EU law has been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a Member State of the European Union, which is not permitted to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling?[20]
The Opinion of the Advocate General
On 16 January 2025, before the CJEU had issued its decision, the Advocate General, Tamara Capeta, released her opinion to the Court.[21]
In this opinion, the Advocate General recalled that under Article 19(1) TEU, Members States are under an obligation to ensure that subjects of EU law enjoy the right under Article 267 TFEU to access to an independent court previously established by law and with the power to refer to the CJEU and pointed out that the CAS and the Swiss Federal Tribunal are not such courts, highlighting the precedent set in the 2023 case Semenya v. Switzerland, where the European Court of Human Rights found that the review of a CAS award performed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal was so limited that it was not capable of ensuring fundamental rights protection.[22]
With regard to the first question, Capeta recommended that the CJEU find the application of the national laws giving res judicata effect to arbitral awards that have not been reviewed by a Member State incompatible with EU law.[23] She considered it of primary importance that players and clubs have no choice but to submit to FIFA’s internal disciplinary procedures and subsequently to CAS.[24] Because of this, she proposed that individuals should have the right to seek a full review of FIFA’s rules under EU law in any judicial proceedings, whether as a direct challenge to FIFA’s rules, in enforcement of a CAS award, or incidentally in other proceedings, such as actions for damages.[25]
Concerning the second question, Capeta opined that a rebuttable presumption of probative value does not prevent national courts from discharging their obligations under Article 19(1) TEU, given that they remain able to ensure the full application of EU law, if necessary, by submitting a preliminary reference to the CJEU.[26] Therefore, she considered that national laws according probative value to arbitral awards reviewed by non-member States are not incompatible with EU law.
The CJEU’s Decision
In its decision, decided by the Grand Chamber, the CJEU recalled the importance of the right to effective judicial protection in EU law, while noting that this does not preclude individuals from having recourse to arbitration, so long as it remains possible for the individuals concerned by the arbitration award to obtain a review, by a court or tribunal of a Member State, as to whether the award is consistent with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy and which are relevant to the dispute concerned, as the CJEU previously decided in the December 2023 decision, International Skating Union v. Commission.[27]
It also recognised that the freedom of movement for workers, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 45, 46 and 63 TFEU also form part of EU public policy, so when disputes relate to the pursuit of a sports as an economic activity within the EU, judicial review as to the conformity of arbitral awards made in those disputes is particularly important.[28]
The CJEU then pointed out that the arbitration mechanisms employed by sports associations like FIFA are, in effect, unilaterally imposed on athletes and clubs through the associations’ rules.[29]
It then clarified the requirements which judicial review of awards stemming from such a mandatory mechanism must meet in order to enable the national courts of tribunals having jurisdiction to guarantee individuals the effective judicial protection to which they are entitled, under Article 47 of the Charter, and which the Member States are required to ensure in the field covered by EU law, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU:[30]
- The sports association concerned must put in place an arbitration mechanism that is subject to a direct legal remedy within the EU or the possibility must exist for individuals to obtain indirectly from any court or tribunal of a Member State that is liable to examine such an award in any manner whatsoever, effective judicial review as to whether that award is consistent with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy.[31]
- The courts or tribunals that are called upon to carry out the review must be able to review the interpretation of the principles or provisions that form part of EU public policy, the legal consequences attached to that interpretation and the legal classification given in light of that interpretation of the facts as established and assessed by the arbitration body.[32]
- The courts or tribunals must be able to draw all the appropriate legal conclusions (order damages, bring an end to the conduct amounting to the infringement) where such an inconsistency is found to exist.[33]
- The courts or tribunals must have the power to grant interim measures which ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the substance of the case, including where that court or tribunal makes a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.[34]
Thus, where the national provisions applicable to a given dispute – such as the Belgian provisions at issue conferring the authority of res judicata and probative value in the relations between the parties and third parties on an arbitral award without it first being subject to the required judicial review of consistency with EU public policy – may hinder the full effectiveness of Article 19(1) TEU-compliant judicial review as outlined above, the CJEU found that the national court or tribunal must disapply them of its own motion, if it cannot interpret them in conformity with EU law.[35]
Conclusion of the CJEU
Therefore, the CJEU reached the following conclusion on the questions referred to it:
The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding the authority of res judicata from being conferred within the territory of a Member State on an award made by the CAS, in relations between the parties to the dispute in the context of which that award was made, where that dispute is linked to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the EU and the consistency of that award with the principles and provisions of EU law which form part of EU public policy has not first been subject to effective review by a court or tribunal of that Member State that is authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.[36]
It also prohibits the conferral of probative value, as a consequence of res judicata, on such an award in the relations between the parties to that dispute and third parties.[37]
Discussion
In making its decision, the CJEU departed from the Advocate General’s recommendations on several points. First, contrary to Capeta’s recommendation that giving probative value to awards not reviewed for EU public policy compliance by Member State courts be permitted, the CJEU decided that because the grant of such probative value to the arbitral award at issue was one of the consequences which national law attaches to the authority of res judicata, with the aim of rendering that arbitral award such as to be relied on against third parties, it is directly and intrinsically linked to res judicata and is likewise impermissible.[38]
Second, and more importantly, instead of requiring a full merits review of FIFA’s rules under EU law, it confined judicial review strictly to matters of EU public policy, such as free movement and competition law.[39] This restraint has been welcomed.
For example, on the same day the CJEU issued its judgment, the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”), which administers and finances the CAS, issued a statement in response, acknowledging that the CJEU limited the required review of CAS arbitral awards to issues of EU public policy. On this topic, Matthieu Reeb, CAS Director General, said: “We note that the CJEU did not follow the opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta in full and determined that the potential review of CAS awards by state courts in the EU should be limited to EU public policy. In service to the international sports community, CAS will continue to provide timely and expert dispute resolution worldwide.”[40]
The most immediate consequence of the ruling is that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court will no longer enjoy an exclusive role in reviewing CAS awards: EU courts now also have jurisdiction to review such awards where EU public policy is implicated.[41] As one commentator noted, no matter how compliant with EU law the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s “review of CAS awards might be in the future, it cannot legally replace within the territory of the European Union a review by a court of a Member State authorised to make a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.”[42] Some have even suggested that CAS could respond by designating an alternative EU seat, such as Dublin, to streamline review by EU courts, an approach already adopted by the Union of European Football Associations.[43]
Nevertheless, the consequences of the judgment are relatively contained, since it applies only to CAS awards implicating EU public policy (free movement, competition, etc.), which is not true of many CAS awards. Yet even within this limit, the judgment may generate disparities between EU and non-EU athletes and clubs. For EU-based parties, the RFC Seraing decision strengthens judicial certainty by ensuring that EU courts can safeguard their EU law rights in arbitration. For non-EU players and clubs, however, it introduces new uncertainty: their awards may now be challenged in EU jurisdictions where such review was previously unavailable, but they themselves cannot seek additional review outside Switzerland.
This uneven playing field has led some commentators to call for broader reform. In England, for example, athletes are excluded from the protections offered by EU law since Brexit. Reflecting on this, one lawyer argued that “[s]ports participants in England ought to have the same rights to access to justice as those in Europe. Given the non-applicability of European law since Brexit, this means that (absent some unlikely legislative intervention) the English common law ought to adapt, in the way it has so often done, to recognise the reality of forced sports arbitration.”[44]
Conclusion
The RFC Seraing judgment represents the continuation of a trend in the relationship between EU law and international sports arbitration. While preserving CAS’s global role, the CJEU carved out a safeguard: EU courts cannot be sidelined where public policy is at stake. This ensures that the freedoms of movement, competition rules, and other principles of EU law remain protected, even in the context of mandatory arbitration.
By striking a delicate balance, respecting the autonomy of international sports governance while reinforcing the primacy of EU law, the decision strengthens legal certainty for EU-based participants, yet continues to chip away at the independence of sports arbitration.
[1] Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA, Case C-600/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:617, para. 21.
[2] Ibid., paras. 22-23.
[3] Ibid., para. 24.
[4] Ibid., paras. 25-26.
[5] Ibid., paras. 27-29.
[6] Ibid., para. 30.
[7]Ibid., para. 33.
[8] Ibid., para. 34.
[9] Ibid., para. 37.
[10] Ibid., para. 41.
[11] Ibid., para. 43.
[12] Ibid., para. 44.
[13] Ibid., paras. 45-46.
[14] Ibid., paras. 48-49.
[15] Ibid., para. 50.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., para. 59.
[20] Ibid., para. 59.
[21] Opinion of Advocate General Capeta of 16 January 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA, Case C-600/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:24.
[22] Ibid., paras. 43-44, 60.
[23] Ibid., para. 49.
[24] Ibid., para. 123.
[25] Ibid., paras. 123-126.
[26] Ibid., paras. 127-135.
[27] Judgment of 1 August 2025, Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. FIFA, UEFA and URBSFA, Case C-600/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:617, paras. 69, 79.
[28] Ibid., para. 89-91.
[29] Ibid., para. 93.
[30] Ibid., para. 98.
[31] Ibid., para. 99.
[32] Ibid., para. 101.
[33] Ibid., paras. 102-103.
[34] Ibid., para. 105.
[35] Ibid., para. 120.
[36] Ibid., para. 125.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., para. 113-114.
[39] J. Wauters et al., Court of Justice of the European Union delivers ruling in Royal Football Club Seraing (C-600/23), 15 August 2025, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/court-justice-european-union-delivers-ruling-royal-football-club-seraing-c-60023 (last accessed 16 September 2025).
[40] ICAS Statement on Review of CAS Awards by European Courts for Matters of EU Public Policy, 1 August 2025.
[41] J. Wauters et al., Court of Justice of the European Union delivers ruling in Royal Football Club Seraing (C-600/23), 15 August 2025, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/court-justice-european-union-delivers-ruling-royal-football-club-seraing-c-60023 (last accessed 16 September 2025).
[42] J. Callewaert, Different but compatible approaches to international sports arbitration: comparing Semenya (ECtHR) with Royal Football Club Seraing (CJEU), 20 August 2025, https://johan-callewaert.eu/different-but-compatible-approaches-to-international-sports-arbitration-comparing-semenya-ecthr-with-royal-football-club-seraing-cjeu/ (last accessed 16 September 2025).
[43] D. Mavromati, The Seraing v. FIFA Judgment of the CJEU: Essential Takeaways, 12 August 2025, https://www.sportlegis.com/2025/08/12/the-seraing-v-fifa-judgment-of-the-cjeu-essential-takeaways/ (last accessed 16 September 2025).
[44] N. De Marco, RFC Seraing and the Problem with Forced Sports Arbitration in England, 4 August 2025, https://www.sportslawbulletin.org/rfc-seraing-v-fifa-and-the-problem-with-forced-sports-arbitration-in-england/ (last accessed 16 September 2025).
