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ICJ Finds Myanmar Responsible for Rohingya Genocide: Key Findings and Implications

22/11/2026 by Aceris Law LLC

On 19 November 2026, the International Court of Justice (“Court”) delivered its merits judgment (“Judgment”) in proceedings brought by the Republic of The Gambia (“The Gambia”) against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (“Myanmar”). The Court held that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State during its 2017 clearance operations, in breach of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”).[1]

The Judgment addresses how genocidal intent can be established through circumstantial evidence and clarifies the distinct obligations to prevent genocide, investigate suspected offences and enact implementing legislation. It also confirms that a State which has not itself suffered injury may seek reparation in the interests of the protected group and its members. These questions give the decision significance beyond the determination of Myanmar’s responsibility.[2]

Facts

The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group with a distinct language and culture. Before the 2017 clearance operations, approximately 815,000 Rohingya lived in northern Rakhine State. Their position had been weakened by longstanding discriminatory laws and administrative practices affecting citizenship, freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, food and healthcare, and the registration of children. Restrictions also governed marriage and births.[3]

The-Gambia-v-Myanmar-ICJ-Genocide-JudgmentIn October 2016 and August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (“ARSA”) attacked Myanmar’s security forces. On 25 August 2017, ARSA carried out coordinated attacks on at least 30 security outposts. Myanmar launched clearance operations that same day, presenting them as a response to the insurgency. The Court accepted that ARSA had conducted attacks and that credible evidence implicated it in violence against civilians.[4]

The ensuing operations involved killings, widespread sexual violence, attacks on children and fleeing civilians, and extensive destruction of Rohingya villages. The Court considered an estimate of at least 10,000 deaths supported by the evidence, without conclusively fixing the total. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. The subsequent clearance of village sites, construction of security installations and settlement of other communities impeded their return.[5]

These events occurred against a background of anti-Rohingya hate speech. The Court found that the military had organised a coordinated Facebook network which portrayed the Rohingya as a threat and promoted hostility towards them. This evidence later formed part of the Court’s assessment of intent.[6]

The Gambia instituted proceedings on 11 November 2019. On 23 January 2020, the Court ordered provisional measures concerning the protection of the Rohingya, the conduct of Myanmar’s military and related actors, the preservation of evidence and reporting. In its judgment of 22 July 2022, the Court upheld its jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention and found the application admissible. Eleven States subsequently intervened on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention.[7]

Issues

The principal questions before the Court were:

  • Whether Myanmar’s conduct satisfied the material elements of genocide and whether the evidence established the specific intent to destroy the Rohingya as a protected group, in whole or in substantial part.[8]
  • Whether Myanmar had separately breached its obligations to prevent genocide, refrain from direct and public incitement, investigate and punish the relevant offences, and enact legislation implementing the Genocide Convention.[9]
  • Whether The Gambia’s standing to invoke Myanmar’s responsibility also entitled it to seek assurances and guarantees of non-repetition and reparation for the Rohingya, and what remedies were appropriate.[10]
  • Whether Myanmar had complied with the Court’s provisional measures of 23 January 2020.[11]

Holding

By nine votes to six, the Court held that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya group in northern Rakhine State. It found that killings, serious bodily and mental harm, and measures intended to prevent births satisfied Article II(a), (b) and (d), respectively, and had been committed with the specific intent to destroy a substantial part of the protected group. Myanmar consequently breached Articles I and III(a) of the Genocide Convention. The separate allegation concerning destructive conditions of life under Article II(c) was not established.[12]

The Court also found breaches of the duties to prevent genocide by individuals acting alongside Myanmar’s security forces, punish genocide and other Article III offences, and enact the necessary legislation. It rejected the separate claim that Myanmar had directly and publicly incited private persons to commit genocide. It further found a breach of the provisional measure requiring preservation of evidence.[13]

The Gambia was entitled to seek remedies for the Rohingya despite not being an injured State. The Court ordered legislative compliance, immediate and effective investigations followed by prosecution and punishment where warranted, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, restitution and compensation for damage not made good by restitution. The amount and modalities of compensation or other reparation were reserved for a subsequent phase.[14]

The Judgment concerns Myanmar’s international responsibility as a State. It does not determine the criminal guilt of particular individuals, which is governed by a distinct legal regime.[15]

Reasoning

The Court assessed the evidence independently and retained a demanding standard of proof.

The Gambia bore the burden of establishing the alleged breaches. For genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III, the Court required “fully conclusive” evidence. Claims concerning the duties to prevent and punish required proof at a high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation. These standards were distinct from the lower threshold which triggers a State’s obligation to investigate suspected offences.[16]

The Court assessed witness accounts, investigative reports, satellite imagery and other material. It regarded the factual reports of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (“Fact-Finding Mission”) as generally reliable, despite the lower evidentiary standard used in their preparation. The Fact-Finding Mission’s methodology and corroboration were central to that assessment. Material collected by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (“Investigative Mechanism”) also carried considerable weight. The Court nevertheless gave no probative value to third-party legal conclusions and made its own findings.[17]

Myanmar’s control over relevant evidence and its lack of cooperation justified more liberal recourse to factual inferences concerning matters largely or exclusively within its knowledge. This did not reverse the burden of proof or require Myanmar to disprove genocide.[18]

The protected group and the meaning of its destruction required separate examination.

The Court identified the Rohingya of Myanmar as a protected ethnic group by reference to their language, culture, institutions, self-identification and treatment by Myanmar. The approximately 815,000 Rohingya living in northern Rakhine State before the operations constituted a substantial part of that group on numerical grounds alone. Attribution of the conduct of Myanmar’s security forces and other State organs to Myanmar was undisputed.[19]

Genocide required both an enumerated material act and the specific intent to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part, as such. Each material act also carried its own mental element. The Court explained that destruction of a group is not confined to the death or biological destruction of its individual members, or even to their physical injury. Serious mental harm and the forcible transfer of children illustrate how the enumerated acts may destroy a group’s continued existence without killing its members. This interpretation remained tied to the acts listed in Article II and did not make destruction of cultural heritage alone genocide.[20]

Three categories of material acts were established.

For Article II(a), the Court found large-scale intentional killings by Myanmar’s security forces. Intentional killing included conduct undertaken with the purpose of causing death or with knowledge that death was a likely consequence. Apart from the distinctive requirements of Article II(c), the material acts did not carry an independent minimum numerical threshold. The scale of the violence remained relevant to the separate question of genocidal intent.[21]

Under Article II(b), the Court found serious bodily and mental harm arising from physical attacks, sexual violence, the loss and disappearance of relatives, and the circumstances of displacement. Forced displacement did not itself establish this material act. Its circumstances, including family separation, dangerous journeys, destruction of homes and inability to return, could nevertheless cause the required grave and long-term disadvantage to victims’ ability to lead normal and constructive lives. Harm did not have to be permanent or irremediable. The Court assessed these harms cumulatively, without assuming that every act caused serious mental harm to every affected person.[22]

Article II(d) covered measures intended to prevent births and objectively capable of doing so. Proof that the measures actually reduced the group’s birth rate was unnecessary. The Court considered the combined effects and purposes of coercive marriage and birth restrictions, denial of legal registration to Rohingya children, and widespread sexual violence, viewed against official messages portraying Rohingya population growth as a threat. It found the material element established.[23]

By contrast, Article II(c) required conditions of life objectively capable of causing the death, over time, of at least a substantial part of the group. Despite the severe restrictions and deprivation experienced by the Rohingya, the evidence did not conclusively establish that demanding requirement. The concentrated violence of the clearance operations also did not constitute conditions of life of the character contemplated by that provision. No claim under Article II(e), concerning the forcible transfer of children to another group, had been advanced.[24]

Genocidal intent emerged from the evidence considered as a whole.

There was no direct evidence of a general genocidal plan. The Court therefore considered whether genocidal intent could be inferred from the circumstances. It rejected a rigid approach requiring a predetermined checklist or a separate preliminary finding of a pattern of conduct. Its assessment considered the general context, selective targeting of the Rohingya, attacks on the group’s foundations, and the systematic nature and scale of the conduct.[25]

The contextual evidence included decades of discrimination, military-sponsored hate speech, previous operations and forced displacement. Rohingya settlements were selectively attacked while neighbouring non-Rohingya areas often remained intact. Destruction of homes and subsequent construction and resettlement undermined prospects of return. The nature of the sexual violence and the deliberate targeting of children were particularly significant because of their effects on the group’s continuity and survival.[26]

The Court also rejected an assessment confined to the proportion of the group killed. Victims of serious harm and measures preventing births had to be considered alongside fatalities. A relatively low percentage of deaths, or the failure to exploit every opportunity to inflict further harm, did not by itself exclude genocidal intent. Nor did systematic conduct require every feature of the operations to occur in every location.[27]

The governing test remained whether genocidal intent was the “only reasonable inference” from the evidence. The Court explained that this did not require genocide to be the perpetrators’ sole objective. Other compatible intentions could coexist with genocidal intent. The requirement was satisfied where only genocidal intent could explain the evidence as a whole, even though individual parts of the record also suggested other purposes.[28]

Myanmar’s proposed alternatives did not explain the totality of the conduct. Although ARSA attacks and the clearance operations were connected in time and place, genuine counterinsurgency did not explain executions, widespread sexual violence, attacks on children and fleeing civilians, and methodical village destruction. An intention merely to displace the population could not account for attacks on people already fleeing or on young children. A punitive purpose likewise failed to explain the scale, methods and nature of the violence, and could in any event coexist with genocidal intent.[29]

The Court also clarified the relationship with international humanitarian law. Compliance with that body of law could inform the assessment of the relevant mental elements, but did not itself place conduct outside the Genocide Convention. The two bodies of law pursued distinct aims, and the Court’s jurisdiction in this case concerned breaches of the Genocide Convention.[30]

The duty to prevent addressed a serious risk posed by private participants.

The separate prevention claim concerned civilians who participated alongside Myanmar’s security forces, insofar as their conduct was not attributable to Myanmar. The Court could not conclusively determine whether those private actors themselves possessed genocidal intent. Their participation nevertheless presented a serious risk of genocide which Myanmar knew or should have known about, and Myanmar manifestly failed to use the preventive means available to it.[31]

The Court emphasised that prevention is a duty of due diligence. It arises when a State knows or should know of a serious risk, including a serious risk of genocidal intent. Responsibility for failing to act is not conditioned on a finding that genocide ultimately occurred. A State capable of taking preventive action cannot remain inactive on the assumption that the risk may not materialise.[32]

The separate incitement claim failed, but the obligation to investigate remained.

Direct and public incitement required more than hate speech or encouragement of violence. The communication had to directly prompt genocide, understood in its context, and be accompanied by genocidal intent. Incitement is independently prohibited even if genocide does not subsequently occur. The military’s Facebook network had publicly encouraged violence against the Rohingya, but the Court was not fully convinced that the relevant messages satisfied those requirements or would have been understood by their audience as direct appeals for genocide. Incitement directed at Myanmar’s own agents was treated as subsumed in the finding that Myanmar committed genocide.[33]

The duty to investigate arose at the earlier point when there were reasonable grounds to suspect offences under Article III within Myanmar’s territorial jurisdiction. It did not depend on prior proof that genocide had occurred or on the precise identification of a suspect. Investigations had to be prompt, thorough, effective, independent and impartial, with prosecution and punishment where warranted and subject to fair-trial requirements.[34]

The Court also held that Article IV encompasses responsibility of superiors for their subordinates’ offences (“superior responsibility”). This applies where superiors knew or should have known that subordinates had committed or were likely to commit the offences, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish them. Domestic constitutional arrangements could not justify non-compliance with the Genocide Convention.[35]

Myanmar’s limited investigations and proceedings did not fulfil these obligations. The Court identified failures to investigate the military command, inadequate penalties and destruction of evidence that obstructed effective investigation. Even though the separate incitement claim failed, the record contained sufficient grounds to require investigation of possible incitement by State and private actors.[36]

Domestic legislation had to implement the whole of the Genocide Convention.

Article V required genocide to be criminalised as a distinct offence incorporating its constituent elements, particularly genocidal intent. Ordinary offences such as murder or rape were insufficient. Myanmar’s 2021 legislation did not cure its non-compliance: it excluded birth-prevention measures permitted by existing domestic law, and Myanmar had not demonstrated that its legislation implemented all the related offences under Article III(b)-(e). A domestic authorisation could not remove conduct from the Genocide Convention’s prohibition.[37]

The Gambia could seek remedies directly benefiting the Rohingya.

The Court’s jurisdiction under Article IX extended to the legal consequences of Myanmar’s breaches. The obligations concerned were owed to all parties to the Genocide Convention, commonly described as obligations erga omnes partes. The Gambia’s legal interest in compliance entitled it to request reparation for the Rohingya as the beneficiaries of those obligations, without a mandate to represent the group or individual victims. It could not seek reparation for itself.[38]

The scope of cessation was carefully limited. The Court had not found genocide to be ongoing. It therefore directed cessation of the continuing failures to enact adequate legislation and investigate, prosecute and punish relevant offences. Myanmar had to take immediate and effective investigative steps and proceed to prosecution and punishment where warranted.[39]

Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition were justified by the exceptional gravity of the violations, entrenched hostility towards the Rohingya, impunity and the absence of effective remedies or concrete protective measures. These assurances and guarantees require action to prevent similar violations from recurring. The Court declined to order full and equal citizenship for every Rohingya, while requiring protection against discrimination, including in access to citizenship and freedom of movement.[40]

The restitution ordered addressed the consequences of Myanmar’s wrongful acts. It required Myanmar to allow and facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced Rohingya to their places of residence and the reunification of families; return or replace individual and collective property lost or damaged; assist in finding the disappeared and recovering, identifying and reburying those killed with dignity and in accordance with Rohingya traditions; provide physical and psychological rehabilitation; and protect the Rohingya against discrimination and persecution. The return obligation covered people displaced within Myanmar as well as those abroad.[41]

Compensation was required for damage not made good by restitution. The Court did not fix a sum or a payment mechanism. Myanmar must submit a report within two years of the Judgment identifying the restitution measures adopted and, where full restitution is materially impossible, specifying the amount and modalities of compensation. After receiving the parties’ views, the Court will determine the further procedure for resolving compensation or other appropriate reparation. The merits findings that have become final cannot be reopened in that phase.[42]

The provisional measures produced a distinct finding on preservation of evidence.

The Court found that construction on former Rohingya village sites and destruction of village remnants after its January 2020 order breached the obligation to preserve evidence. Breaches of the first two provisional measures were not established on the record. Myanmar had complied with the reporting requirement by submitting thirteen reports, and that six-monthly obligation ended with the Judgment. The new two-year reporting requirement for reparation is separate.[43]

Conclusion

The Judgment demonstrates how genocidal intent may be established through a cumulative assessment of context, targeting, methods and consequences. It explains why the analysis must extend beyond fatalities to other acts capable of destroying a protected group, and why an asserted purpose of counterinsurgency, displacement or punishment does not necessarily exclude genocidal intent. Its treatment of prevention and investigation also emphasises the need for State action before the evidence is sufficient to establish completed offences conclusively.[44]

The decision also gives substance to the enforcement of obligations owed to all parties to the Genocide Convention. The Gambia’s lack of direct injury did not prevent it from securing orders of restitution and compensation for the Rohingya. The Judgment establishes responsibility and the obligation to repair the resulting harm, while leaving the amount and modalities of compensation or other appropriate reparation to the reserved proceedings.[45]


[1] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening), Judgment, 19 November 2026, paras. 468-469, 646(1).

[2] Id. paras. 443, 478-488, 513-516, 560-569, 585-590.

[3] Id. paras. 68-69, 134-152, 310.

[4] Id. paras. 173-181.

[5] Id. paras. 249-282.

[6] Id. paras. 153-168, 402-404.

[7] Id. paras. 1-2, 8, 17, 32-39.

[8] Id. paras. 306-311, 373-389.

[9] Id. paras. 470-471, 489-491, 507-509, 555-560.

[10] Id. paras. 575-590.

[11] Id. paras. 627-629.

[12] Id. paras. 372, 468-469, 646(1).

[13] Id. para. 646(2)-(5), (12).

[14] Id. paras. 590, 646(6)-(11).

[15] Id. para. 295.

[16] Id. paras. 79-80, 515.

[17] Id. paras. 83, 95, 100, 109-112, 119-121.

[18] Id. paras. 79, 128-131, 450.

[19] Id. paras. 307-310, 374-380.

[20] Id. paras. 285-293.

[21] Id. paras. 315-319.

[22] Id. paras. 325-337.

[23] Id. paras. 360-371.

[24] Id. paras. 311, 344-356.

[25] Id. paras. 382-397.

[26] Id. paras. 399-422.

[27] Id. paras. 426-435.

[28] Id. paras. 438-443.

[29] Id. paras. 451-467.

[30] Id. paras. 301-305.

[31] Id. paras. 484-488.

[32] Id. paras. 478-479, 487.

[33] Id. paras. 490-500, 502-506.

[34] Id. paras. 513-518.

[35] Id. paras. 522-525.

[36] Id. paras. 545-554.

[37] Id. paras. 563-574.

[38] Id. paras. 579-590, 609-610, 624.

[39] Id. paras. 595-596, 646(6)-(7).

[40] Id. paras. 600-604, 616.

[41] Id. paras. 615-617, 646(9).

[42] Id. paras. 621-625, 646(10)-(11).

[43] Id. paras. 625, 633, 637, 641-645.

[44] Id. paras. 289-293, 430, 443, 451-469, 487, 514-516.

[45] Id. paras. 585-590, 610, 624-625, 646(9)-(11).

Filed Under: Public International Law

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